

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6123

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 2691

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EG, ET, IS, SO, SU, UR, YO

SUBJECT: MINIC VISITS TO HORN OF AFRICA AND MOSCOW

SUMMARY: AT MARCH 31 MEETING WITH CODEL ROSTENKOWSKI, FOREIGN SECRETARY MINIC TERMED YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH U.S. "THE BEST THEY HAVE BEEN FOR 30 YEARS". ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO HORN, MINIC SAID BOTH ETHIOPIANS AND SOMALIS AGREED TO ACCEPT OAU AS MEDIATOR, BUT THAT TALKS WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND PROTRACTED. HE URGED ETHIOPIANS TO GRANT IMMEDIATE AUTONOMY TO OGADEN AND FEDERAL STATUS TO ERITREA, AND ENCOURAGED SUDAN TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN MEDIATION PROCESS. IN MOSCOW, MINIC INFORMED SOVIETS OF TITO'S TALKS WITH CARTER AND HIS CONCERN ABOUT STATE OF DETENTE. GREATEST OBSTACLE IS MISTRUST BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR. SOVIETS SAID THEY ARE READY TO SIGN SALT-2 AND MOVE ON TO SALT-3. ON MIDDLE EAST, MINIC SAID YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE SADAT/BEGIN TALKS HAVE FAILED AND HAVE PROPOSED ACCEPTING WALDHEIM PROPOSAL . SOVIETS REPLIED THAT THEY ACCEPT THIS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE. END SUMMARY.

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1. IN WELCOMING CODEL AT MARCH 31 MEETING, MINIC TERMED YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH U.S. "THE BEST THEY HAVE BEEN FOR 30 YEARS." HE ALSO NOTED THAT HE AND SECRETARY VANCE HAVE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR INCREASED TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IN WHAT HE THEN DESCRIBED AS AN INTIMATE CONVERSATION AMONG FRIENDS, MINIC GAVE A THOROUGH AND FRANK ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT TALKS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND MOSCOW.

2. ON THE OGADEN, MINIC TOLD ETHIOPIANS YUGOSLAVIA HAD SUPPORTED THEM FROM BEGINNING AND THAT THEY HAD NO GROUNDS TO DOUBT YUGOSLAV FRIENDSHIP. YUGOSLAVIA FURNISHED LIMITED AMOUNT OF ARMS FOLLOWING TERMINATION OF U.S. MILITARY AID. YUGOSLAVIA DOES NOT REPROACH ETHIOPIANS FOR TURNING TO USSR FOR ARMS, BUT TOLD THEM CROSSING INTO SOMALIA WOULD BE GRAVE MISTAKE. TITO HAD COME AWAY FROM WASHINGTON AND LONDON TALKS WITH IMPRESSION THAT IF WAR MOVED INTO SOMALIA THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS CONFRONTATION. ETHIOPIANS ASSURED MINIC THEY WOULD NOT CROSS BORDER, AND LISTED THREE REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMALIZATION: THAT SOMALIA RENOUNCE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON ETHIOPIA, KENYA AND DJIBOUTI; THAT SOMALIA RESPECT UN CHARTER AND OAU; AND THAT SOMALIA RESPECT FRONTIER WITH ETHIOPIA. MINIC TOLD ETHIOPIANS YUGOSLAVIA VIEWED OAU AS BEST SUITED FOR ROLE OF MEDIATOR. ETHIOPIANS SAID THEY WOULD ACCEPT OAU ROLE AND PROPOSAL FOR COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES TO MEET IN LAGOS, BUT WOULD PRESENT THEIR THREE DEMANDS. MINIC TOLD ETHIOPIANS THEY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE AUTONOMY TO OGADEN WHICH WOULD RESTORE CONFIDENCE OF LOCAL POPULATION AND MAKE IT EASIER TO COME TO TERMS WITH SOMALIA.

3. IN SOMALIA, SIAD BARRE TOLD MINIC HE HAD ORDERED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AND WOULD AGREE TO LAGOS MEETING, BUT DID NOT REPLY TO THREE ETHIOPIAN DEMANDS. BARRE SAID THAT AT LAGOS HE WOULD PUT FORTH DEMAND THAT OGADEN POPULATION FREELY DECIDE ITS OWN CONFIDENTIAL

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DESTINY AND HAVE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. MINIC REPLIED THIS DIFFICULT SINCE IT A QUESTION OF ETHIOPIAN SOVEREIGNTY, BUT SIAD BARRE FELT THAT UNLESS THIS STEP WERE TAKEN THERE WOULD NOT BE PEACE IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO USE OF OAU COMMITTEE. YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE TALKS WILL BE DIFFICULT AND PROTRACTED, BUT THAT THIS IS THE BEST THAT CAN BE HOPED FOR.

4. ON ERITREA, MINIC TOLD ETHIOPIANS THEY HAD TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION HERE AS WELL AS OGADEN. YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE ERITREA, WHICH IS MULTINATIONAL COUNTRY LIKE YUGOSLAVIA, SHOULD RECEIVE FEDERAL STATUS GRANTED IT BY UN IN 1960. ERITREANS ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH AUTONOMY, AND THUS IF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT NOT REACHED THERE WILL BE PROLONGED WAR IN WHICH ERITREANS WILL BE SUPPORTED BY ARAB STATES.

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ACTION EUR-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6124
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 2691

5. YUGOSLAVIA BELIEVES THE SUDAN COULD BE HELPFUL MEDIATOR BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA AND HAS ENCOURAGED IT TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE. NUMAYRI HAS REPLIED TO TITO THAT SITUATION IS COMPLEX, BUT THAT SUDAN WILL DO ALL POSSIBLE TO ASSIST IN NORMALIZATION. IF SITUATION CAN BE NORMALIZED THERE WILL NOT BE NEED FOR SOVIET "OR OTHER TROOPS" THERE. MINIC EMPHASIZED THAT YUGOSLAV IMPRESSIONS FROM BOTH WASHINGTON AND LONDON TALKS WERE THAT CARTER AND BREZHNEV FELT CONFRONTATION IN THE HORN WOULD BE DISASTROUS.

6. IN MOSCOW, MINIC PRESENTED TITO MESSAGE AND YUGOSLAV VIEWS ON ABOVE ISSUES, WHICH SOVIETS CONSIDERED POSITIVE. SOVIETS STATED THAT IN RESPONSE TO SOMALI REQUEST THEY HAD GIVEN LIMITED AMOUNT OF ARMS AND HAD SENT EXPERTS, BUT HAD GIVEN NO ARMS AID FOR PAST TWO YEARS. THEY HAD ADVISED SIAD BARRE NOT TO ATTACK ETHIOPIA, WHICH SIAD BARRE HAD AGREED TO AND THEN RETURNED TO DO JUST THE OPPOSITE.

7. MINIC SAID TITO'S MESSAGE DEALT WITH DETENTE AND MIDDLE EAST. YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH THE USSR ARE VERY GOOD, NOW THAT SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY RECOGNIZED YUGOSLAV INSISTENCE ON
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INDEPENDENCE, NONALIGNMENT, NON-INTERFERENCE AND EQUALITY. IN ADDITION TO THE U.S., YUGOSLAVIA VALUES ITS RELATIONS WITH BOTH USSR AND THE PRC, EVEN IF THOSE TWO DO NOT AGREE. MINIC SAID HE FELT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD NOT IMPROVE "UNTIL OUR GRANDCHILDREN ARE IN POWER".

8. MINIC INFORMED SOVIETS OF YUGOSLVA IMPRESSIONS OF TITO'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. HE TOLD THEM YUGOSLAVS HAD TOLD CARTER THEY FELT DETENTE WAS IN JEOPARDY, THAT CARTER AND BREZHNEV BOTH WANT GOOD RELATIONS, BUT THAT DETENTE APPEARS AT A STANDSTILL. TITO HAD TOLD CARTER SOVIETS VALUE DETENTE AND BELIEVE IT TO BE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE, BUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS IN EITHER DETENTE OR IMPROVING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. TITO'S MESSAGE EMPHASIZED THAT MISTRUST BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR IS GREATEST OBSTACLE TO DETENTE AND CALLED FOR RESOLUTE STEPS. SALT-2 MUST BE CONCLUDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT-3 BEGUN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. MINIC INFORMED SOVIETS IT WAS TITO'S IMPRESSION THAT U.S. WAS READY FOR THIS. SOVIETS REPLIED "CATEGORICALLY" THAT THEY ARE READY TO SIGN SALT-2 ASAP AND GO ON TO SALT-3.

9. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MISTRUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR MUST ALSO BE REMOVED IF RESOLUTION OF SITUATION IS TO BE FOUND. YUGOSLAVS TOLD SOVIETS THEY BELIEVE THAT SADAT/BEGIN TALKS HAVE FAILED, BUT THAT CARTER STILL BELIEVES THERE IS A CHANCE AND STILL SUPPORTS THEM. MINIC INFORMED SOVIETS OF TITO'S SUGGESTION TO CARTER THAT IT ADVISABLE TO OPEN UP ANOTHER LINE, ACCEPTING WALDHEIM PROPOSAL. HE ALSO TOLD SOVIETS THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAD TOLD HIM THAT IF SADAT/BEGIN TALKS FAILED, TITO'S SUGGESTION MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE AND MANY QUESTIONS MUST BE RESOLVED.

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10. MINIC INFORMED CODEL YUGOSLAVIA HAS NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT CAN GREATLY AFFECT NEGATIVE TREND IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT THAT IT IS ACTING IN THE WORLD INTEREST. YUGOSLAVS WANT DETENTE TO EXTEND BEYOND U.S.-SOVIET AND EAST/WEST CONTEXT TO ENCOMPASS ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD AND ALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, ETC., AREAS. BUT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE FOUNDATION STONE OF FATE OF THE WORLD. MINIC CONCLUDED THAT YUGOSLAVIA IS PURSUING PEACE POLICY, BUT THAT ONLY LEADERS OF THE MAJOR POWERS CAN CHANGE THINGS AND TURN THE NEGATIVE INTO POSITIVE. EAGLEBURGER

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